Spunk Odds Reference

Crash guide

Cyber Crash: committing to rounds with a hash chain

Cyber is the page's label and implies no special technology beyond what is described here. The guide explains commit-reveal for crash games, and in particular the seed chain, a design that lets a service fix thousands of future rounds in advance with one published hash.

The problem commit-reveal solves

If a service could pick the crash point after seeing everyone's targets, it could always end the round just below the most popular one. Commit-reveal blocks that. Before any round, the service publishes a hash of the secret it will use. After the round, it reveals the secret. Anyone can hash the revealed value and confirm that it matches the earlier commitment. SHA-256 makes it infeasible to find a second secret with the same hash, so the service cannot swap secrets later.

Why crash games often use a chain

Some crash designs run one shared round for everyone, with no per-player client seed. One known approach is a chain built backwards. The service picks one random origin seed, hashes it, hashes the result, and repeats many times. It publishes only the final hash in the chain, often called the terminal hash. Rounds then use the chain in reverse: the first round uses the value just before the terminal hash, the next round uses the one before that, and so on.

Each revealed seed checks the one before it. If round 1 used seed s1, then SHA-256(s1) must equal the terminal hash. If round 2 used s2, then SHA-256(s2) must equal s1. Because hashing only runs forwards, nobody can compute s2 from s1, so future rounds stay hidden even though they were fixed at the start.

The table builds a short chain from the origin seed cyber-chain-origin-5b. Real chains have millions of links, but four are enough to see the structure. To turn each seed into a crash point, this example uses HMAC-SHA256 with the seed as key and a fixed public message, cyber-public-salt:0:0, then applies the 1% edge formula to the first 4 bytes.

A backward SHA-256 chain: link 0 is published first, links are revealed in the order 1, 2, 3
LinkValueRoleCrash point
0555aff11c5e7f774ada328177bbe45967732915199616c4fc2232ecbb5681e42terminal hash, published before round 1none
13bec99d2e9b24bcd5117f811b89f62e305c1ca124a8a505bb733082be13aebe7seed for round 11.89x
2bfc88a7ab981864e490265b54e590856b57e39826099aafa33a30549213519a8seed for round 21.20x
3b16e75e5eb5c032e6af162c9ad7502a0272aab4ab3a7dc90bad256433eb97a34seed for round 39.44x

Link 3 is SHA-256 of the origin string. Each link above it is SHA-256 of the link below. A teaching construction, not any service's exact scheme.

To check round 2, take link 2, hash it once, and compare with link 1. To check the whole chain at once, hash link 3 three times and compare with the terminal hash. If any value had been changed after publication, the comparison would fail.

Why the public salt matters

The chain is fixed by the service alone. A careful design mixes in a value nobody could know when the chain was made, such as a string announced only after the terminal hash is public. That stops the service from searching through many origin seeds for a chain that happens to start with low crash points. Without this step, a user has to trust that the chain was not cherry-picked.

Limits of what this proves

For per-player designs with client seeds and nonces, see the Crystal page and the hash fairness guide.